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Abstract Accounts of ontic explanation have often been devised so as to provide
an understanding of mechanism and of causation. Ontic accounts differ quite rad-
ically in their ontologies, and one of the latest additions to this tradition proposed
by Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden and Carl Craver reintroduces the concept of
activity. In this paper I ask whether this influential and activity-based account of
mechanisms is viable as an ontic account. I focus on polygenic scenarios—sce-
narios in which the causal truths depend on more than one cause. The importance of
polygenic causation was noticed early on by Mill (1893). It has since been shown to
be a problem for both causal-law approaches to causation (Cartwright 1983) and
accounts of causation cast in terms of capacities (Dupre´ 1993; Glennan 1997, pp.
605–626). However, whereas mechanistic accounts seem to be attractive precisely
because they promise to handle complicated causal scenarios, polygenic causation
needs to be examined more thoroughly in the emerging literature on activity-based
mechanisms. The activity-based account proposed in Machamer et al. (2000, pp. 1–
25) is problematic as an ontic account, I will argue. It seems necessary to ask, of
any ontic account, how well it performs in causal situations where—at the ex-
planandum level of mechanism—no activity occurs. In addition, it should be asked
how well the activity-based account performs in situations where there are too few
activities around to match the polygenic causal origin of the explanandum. The first
situation presents an explanandum-problem and the second situation presents an
explanans-problem—I will argue—both of which threaten activity-based
frameworks.
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Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are productive
of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions.
(Machamer et al. 2000, p. 3)
1 Mechanisms and Their Activities
Together with his colleagues Lindley Darden and Carl Craver, Peter Machamer
et al. (2000) has designed an influential framework for understanding mechanisms.
Ontologically speaking, the framework is dualistic, postulating entities and
activities as two kinds of ontological building block. These building blocks are
organized in such a way that they are productive of regular changes in the
mechanism’s condition between onset and termination. It is particularly interesting
that, in the relationship between activities and entities, activities are supposed to
play the more important causal, and hence ontically explanatory, role:
Activities are the producers of change. Entities are the things that engage in
activities. (Machamer et al. 2000, p. 3)
To mark the pronounced causal role of activities I shall refer to the framework as
an activity-based account of mechanisms. This label is slightly misleading in one
way, in that it conceals the dualistic nature of the account, but it is appropriate in the
more important respect that it draws attention to what is new and different about the
approach on offer. Machamer and colleagues often draw on examples from
scientific research in molecular biology and neurobiology,1 but it is clear both from
his original work and Machamer’s further elaboration of the metaphysics of
activities, that the intended application of the activity-based account is wider. The
vast majority of the activities referred to in Machamer (2004) are not drawn from
scientific settings. Examples include: running, bonding, flowing, the glass shattering
and flying into a thousand pieces, breaking, boozing, covering up, and hiding.
2 Ontic Explanations and Contextualization of the Argument
Interest in causal mechanisms in the 1980s and onwards was intimately linked with
the idea of ontic explanation.2
According to the ontic conception—as I see it, at least—an explanation of an
event involves exhibiting that event as it is embedded in its causal network
and/or displaying its internal causal structure. The causal network, external or
internal, consists of causal processes transmitting causal influence and causal
interactions in which the structures of the interacting processes are modified.
(Salmon 1984, p. 298)
1 Compare Tabery (2004).
2 The ontic conception, in turn, was inspired by certain previous perspectives on causal explanation
(Salmon 1984, p. 293). For an early version of such an inspiring view, see Scriven (1971).
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Mechanisms and ontic explanations are still conceived in tandem. Machamer
et al. (2000, sect. 3) emphasizes the ontic adequacy of conceptualizing mechanisms
in terms of activities,3 and concludes by suggesting that ‘‘thinking about
mechanisms gives a better way to think about one’s ontic commitments’’
(Machamer et al. 2000, p. 23); Craver (2007, p. 27) explicitly adopts Salmon’s
conception of ontic explanation in his mechanistic account of neuroscience; and so
on. Alleged scientific examples of ontic explanation abound in Salmon’s texts and
the mechanistic literature in general, but in several examples it remains a little
unclear what an ontic explanation implies about the nature of the explanandum.4 For
the purposes of this article I suggest the following partial but general character-
ization of the ontic conception.
On the ontic conception, explanations are relations between worldly existents.5
Ontic explanations may be partly or wholly cross-categorial in respect of the relata
they relate (with mechanisms explaining regular changes, and so on), but this need
not be the case (facts might explain facts, for example). The explanatory relation is
often causal, but on a mechanistic view it may also be structural or ‘‘componential’’
(Craver 2007, p. 74). Which relation is at issue is assumed to depend on whether the
explanation is aetiological or constitutive. Note that my stipulation is not motivated
by the demand that, of the following two ways of putting the ontic conception, we
should abandon the latter, statement-version:
It seems to me that either way of putting the ontic conception is acceptable;
one can properly say that the explanandum-fact is explained by the explanans-
facts or that the explanans-statements explain the explanandum-statement.
(Salmon 1989, p. 86)
The statement-version is presumably compatible with the ontic conception via
the truth-makers of the explanans- and explanandum-statements. The stipulation is
merely intended to ensure that the explanandum-facts are supposed to be real
worldly existents.
Machamer et al. (2000) contains little explicit talk about explanation. However,
one thing it does say is that ‘‘explanation involves revealing the productive relation.
It is the unwinding, bonding, and breaking that explain protein synthesis; it is the
binding, bending, and opening that explain the activity of Na? channels. It is not the
regularities that explain but the activities that sustain the regularities.’’ This
characterization clearly emphasizes the ontic elements by requiring a productive
relation between explanans and explanandum.6 When this view is combined with
3 Tabery (2004, p. 8) emphasizes this, too.
4 Salmon’s celebrated distinction between epistemic, ontic, and modal conceptions of explanation has
been criticized of late. For one objection, see Strevens (2008, p. 11). It is not my purpose to add to the
general evaluation. I am concerned only with ontic explanations.
5 As far as I can see this reading was intended by (Coffa and) Salmon from the start: ‘‘Because of its
emphasis on existent physical relationships, this view may be called the ontic conception of scientific
explanation.’’ (Salmon 1982/1998, p. 54)
6 See Bogen (2005, p. 398) for a similar interpretation of Machamer’s standpoint. Craver (2007, p. 28),
on the other hand, places the account among views that think of explanation as explaining by subsuming a
phenomenon under a general representation, prototype, or schema.
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the perspective on activities offered in Machamer (2004) it becomes a rather distinct
mechanistic alternative that makes good sense of the idea of ontic explanations.
My focus on ontic explanations involving genuine activities has the consequence
that the following discussion will be relevant only to certain mechanistic views; I
am not seeking to attack mechanisms in general. Before we start it might be helpful
to indicate in more detail what this article is not meant to be about. The observations
I make will arguably prove irrelevant in the context of non-ontic mechanistic
accounts.7 My observations will also be irrelevant in the context of mechanistic
accounts where activities play no, or at best a marginalized, role.8
Is the present problem relevant only in connection with Machamer’s view, then?
Not necessarily. It ought to bear to some extent on other ontic accounts of
mechanisms conceived in terms of processes or activities. What about later
developments of the view presented in Machamer et al. (2000), such as that
adumbrated in Craver (2007)? Its other merits notwithstanding, the ontic standpoint
in Craver (2007) is expressed in relatively unspecific terms, and this makes it more
difficult to see what it is ontologically committed to with regard to the nature of the
explananda. It seems to me that the priority of activities as the building blocks of
mechanisms and explananda is downplayed.9
The activity-based account of mechanisms is, I submit, one of the more important
developments in the mechanistic literature. It involves a distinctive take on what has
been the core problem in philosophical reasoning about ontic explanation
throughout the last couple of decades. That is why it will be the primary focus of
this article. Its ontic aspects are clearly worthy of attention.
Before we proceed to the argument it should, perhaps, also be noted that I am not
the first to identify and discuss problems with the activity-based account. For
instance, Psillos (2004), Tabery (2004), and Campaner (2006) focus on the
problematic concept of activity as well. However, none attacks the problem I am
interested in. The rather fundamental problem with activities I explore here has not
been addressed before—at least, to my knowledge.10
7 One, and a particularly clear, such account is given in Elster (2007). This characterizes mechanisms in a
way that makes them depend on our epistemic condition.
8 There are an increasing number of such views, and I make no pretence of covering this field. Overviews
of different phases of the mechanistic movement are provided in Psillos (2002), Tabery (2004), Campaner
(2006) and elsewhere. However, a few examples will help to illustrate the kinds of view that are unlikely
to be touched by the arguments of this article: the idea that the internal parts of mechanisms interact to the
produce the system’s external behavior set out in Glennan (1996); the modular perspective on the
behavior of parts of mechanisms (with the parts conforming to generalizations that are invariant under
interventions) set out in Woodward (2002); and the trope view of mechanisms set out in Persson (1997).
9 Cf. the following passage from Craver (2007, p. 5, my emphasis): ‘‘This is a mechanism in the sense
that it is a set of entities and activities organized such that they exibit the phenomenon to be explained.’’
Moreover, explananda are not so clearly produced in Craver’s account—in fact, part-whole relations
between explanans and explananda seem more salient there (see Craver 2007, p. 139 and p. 165). These
might be purely terminological changes on Craver’s part, but since I am not sure I plan to stay strictly
within the perspective offered by Machamer et al. (2000) and Machamer (2004).
10 Psillos (2004, p. 314) also discusses the way in which activities struggle to explain causal interaction,
but he focuses on another problem: ‘‘Note that it wouldn’t help to try to explain the interaction between
two parts of a mechanism (say parts A and B) by positing an intermediate part C. For then we would have
to explain the interaction between parts A and C by positing another intermediate part D and so on (ad
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3 What is an Activity?
To examine the activity-based approach we need to identify some of its testable
consequences. Below, I will describe one of these. It should be noted, however, that
Machamer and his colleagues have not found it easy to provide a useful
characterization of activities. They offer plenty of examples; and Machamer
(2004, p. 29) gives quite a number of synonyms, or near-synonyms, of ‘activities’ as
well: producings, happenings, ways of acting, processes and behaviors. However,
nothing resembling a general account of activities has been provided.11
It should be clear that actualization is a central element of the concept of activity.
In his work on Aristotle, Ross (1930, p. 82) says: ‘‘In each moment of activity,
potentiality is completely canceled and transformed into actuality.’’ There are no
references to Aristotle in Machamer et al. (2000) or Machamer (2004) on this
matter, but this characteristic of activities cannot have changed much. On the other
hand, it is far from obvious that everyone interested in activities would be keen to
postulate, or accommodate, potentiality in the world. In view of this, I would prefer
to sidestep any potentially controversial issues raised by potentialities and
actualities by claiming only that the following implication holds:
If entity E engages in activity U, then E is U-ing.
I will refer to this as the actualization claim. If the wheel (entity) engages in
spinning (activity), then the wheel is spinning. If the heart (entity) engages in
pumping blood (activity), the heart is pumping blood. This relationship relates
activities to all of the near-synonyms listed above—to producings, happenings,
ways of acting, processes, and behaviors; and it is unlikely to prompt any
misgivings. Thus, the conditional above holds true for anyone who wants to deploy
activities in the causal role attributed to them by Machamer and his colleagues.
We might add the following observation to the trivial one made above. There are
two ways in which we might like to cash out U-ing in the actualization claim. First,
nobody engages in the activity of running unless someone is running (someone
runs). It is not enough that there is merely an attempted running, or that there is the
potential or a capacity to run. Second, the glass does not engage in the activity of
shattering into a thousand pieces unless the thousand pieces actually result. It is not
enough that the process begins if it is never completed—say, because the glass is
caught before it hits the ground. Now let us compare these two cases.
The first case of U-ing, running, is most naturally understood in terms of its
intrinsic qualities. When there is a U-ing of this sort, there is broadly speaking a
Footnote 10 continued
infinitum?).’’ Tabery (2004) argues that a complete account of mechanisms requires elements of both
interactions and activities. Campaner (2006) criticizes the imprecise conception of activity deployed in
activity-based accounts (and some other key concepts of alternative mechanistic perspectives as well).
For (somewhat overlapping) explorations of the general problems of causation discussed in this article,
see Dowe (2008), Hall (2004), Mellor (1995), Persson (1997; 2002), and Wolff (2007). However, none of
these discussions explicitly concerns activities. Uskali Ma¨ki’s observation that mechanisms exist even
when not operating is along the lines I am interested in, too, but there is a clear difference between us in
that I am concerned here with operating mechanisms only.
11 See Tabery (2004) and Campaner (2006) for similar observations.
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process of a certain kind. If Peter, the entity, engages in the activity of running,
Peter is running (Peter runs). This kind of case fits well with the idea that activities
are usually designated by a verb or verb form—something which is noted in
Machamer et al. (2000, p. 4), and which is reminiscent of Anscombe’s (1981/1993)
comparable view of causation a few decades earlier.
The second case of U-ing, shattering into a thousand pieces, is more naturally
understood in terms of the result or end-state of what happens. When there is a U-
ing of this sort there is an effect of a certain kind. If the glass, the entity, engages in
the activity of shattering into a thousand pieces, there are a thousand pieces of glass
(on my floor, for instance). This kind of case fits well with the idea that activities are
constitutive of transformations that yield new states of affairs.12 I should perhaps
emphasize here that I am not claiming that there are two distinct kinds of activity.
Presumably every U-ing has both an intrinsic quality and an effect-side. At least,
this should be true of activities in mechanisms.
Indeed both characteristics seem to be highly relevant to a mechanistic project of
the sort described above. Activities are supposed to provide a productive continuity
between cause and effect, and accounting for this productive continuity is a major
concern within the activity-based framework:
Productive continuities are what make the connection between stages
intelligible. If a mechanism is represented schematically by A?B?C, then
the continuity lies in the arrows and their explication is in terms of the
activities that the arrows represent. A missing arrow, namely, the inability to
specify an activity, leaves an explanatory gap in the productive continuity of
the mechanism. (Machamer et al. 2000, p. 3)
Looking at our two ways of conceiving activities, the intrinsic quality of U-ing is
central to the account because it ensures continuity. One factor driving the activity-
based programme is a strong aversion to conceptions of change couched in terms of
the mere possession of different properties at different times. This is made explicit
in the particular programme I am taking as my starting point:
Mechanisms do things. They are active and so ought to be described in terms
of the activities of their entities, not merely in terms of changes in their
properties. (Machamer et al. 2000, p. 5)
… we might say that activities are ways of acting, processes, or behaviours; they
are active rather than passive; dynamic rather than static. (Machamer 2004, p. 29)
However, while an activity provides continuity in virtue of the intrinsic qualities
of U-ing, it may nevertheless fail to produce the characteristic result or end-state.
Therefore, the effect-element of activities is important too. Whether or not U-ing is
cashed out exclusively in terms of effects,13 the fact that activities in mechanisms
are productive is important:
12 Compare Machamer et al. (2000, p. 4).
13 Activity as a functional kind is the strongest expression of this idea. It combines well with the
teleological understanding of mechanisms one sometimes finds in the literature on activity-based
mechanisms: Machamer et al. (2000), Machamer (2004, p. 36).
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Particularly, discovering activities, the ‘doing’ or productive parts of
mechanisms, is the finding of causes. (Machamer 2004, p. 28)
Asked to defend an activity-based view of mechanisms, I would like to combine
these two characteristics of activities so that the relevant activities of a mechanism
were those involving both an intrinsic quality (a certain kind of process, broadly
speaking) and an effect of U-ing. Only in that way can it be guaranteed that a certain
U-ing provides not only continuity (process) or production (effect) but also a
combination of these—that is to say, a productive continuity between the input and
the output of the mechanism. This view, however, cannot easily be extracted from
the writings of Machamer and colleagues. It is too implicit in what they say. Hence
at this point I no longer claim to be following their example. Be that as it may, I now
have the testable consequence I need.
4 Polygenic Effects
In their definition of mechanisms, Machamer and his colleagues speak about the
organization of activities. Since activities are supposed to be closely related to
causes, it is a small step from such talk to the idea of polygenic effects, i.e., effects
that have more than one cause (or effects resulting from the organization of several
activities). Prima facie many activities are such that it would be difficult to arrange
them in a way that preserves the U-ings, W-ings and other actualizations that we
have just concluded are necessary if some entity is to engage in a certain activity. In
other words, activities seem to face a threat from polygeny. It is this threat that I
examine in the remainder of the paper.
I begin with a simple example of polygeny: a motorboat heading east (B) is
suddenly affected by strong winds from the south, with the effect that the boat ends
up northeast of its present position (C). This effect is polygenic (Fig. 1).
It is natural to conceptualize this example, as Mill (1893, Bk. III, Ch. VI) did, in
terms of forces: ‘‘a body is propelled in two directions by two forces, one tending to
drive it to the north and the other to the east […].’’ It is, moreover, tempting to follow
Mill (ibid.) in his claim that, in this case, both forces have their full effect. The boat is
‘‘left precisely where it would have arrived if it had been acted upon first by one of the
two forces, and afterwards by the other’’. Whether this is strictly true in real-life
situations is another matter. Maybe the wind causes changes, such as waves in the
environment around the boat, which make a difference to its capacity, or capacities, to
move forward. But we do not need to consider such issues at this point.
5 Two Kinds of Polygeny
There is a common and in many ways unproblematic kind of polygeny: polygeny with
respect to different properties of the effect or affected object. In many cases polygenic
effects emerge precisely because the effect or affected object has many properties
which the various causal contributors act upon. An apple, for instance, becomes ripe
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and red at the same time, but ripening, we may assume, is a response to temperature,
while reddening is a response to UV-exposure. Or, to recycle Hempel’s (1970, pp.
421–423) example: the lava stream from the eruption of Vesuvius took a certain path;
it had certain physical and chemical properties; and it occurred at a certain time that
day in the year AD 79. Different combinations of causal contributor may have affected
each of these properties. If the effect is the event, i.e., the eruption of Vesuvius, then
this event is polygenic in virtue of the contributions to various properties of it.
Therefore, polygeny is an especially common feature of theories positing events or
other complex ‘‘thick’’ particulars (Armstrong 1978, p. 114) as causal relata.
The motorboat example, however, may be of a different polygenic kind. There
the causal contributors act simultaneously, not only on different, but also on the
same, property of the affected object. The forces exerted by the wind and the boat’s
engine both contribute to what are literally the same effects—some of which are
represented by the boat’s actual track from its starting position to C.14
So, if we take the causal relata to be events or thick particulars with several
properties or aspects, polygeny is a phenomenon that emerges in two ways. It
emerges, first, when different causal contributors affect different properties of the
particular; and, second, when there is a joint contribution to one of its properties. It
might also occur where the causal relata are ‘‘atomic’’ facts, tropes or single aspects
of particulars, but then only in the second way. I will assume that it is primarily the
handling of polygeny of the second kind that might be problematic within the
activity-based account of mechanisms.
6 Activities and Polygeny
The activity-based account of mechanisms makes a lot of sense. Accounts of




Fig. 1 Polygenic causation
14 Both forces certainly contribute to other aspects, such as the speed of the boat, as well. This is because
powers are often pleiotropic, i.e., such as to contribute to several effects. Compare Molnar (2003, p. 194).
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terms of the activities and regular changes that result from this, are useful in a
number of ways. However, these accounts also have limitations, and one limitation
becomes apparent when we look into two kinds of situation where more than one
causal contributor is acting simultaneously. In the first situation of this sort, as a
result of balancing causal contributors, nothing relevant happens, i.e., there is
neither a relevant process nor a relevant effect that can constitute the actualization
of an activity or a regular change at the relevant explanandum level. Hence there is
nothing the activity-based mechanism can produce or explain ontically. In the
second kind of situation there is, as a result of polygeny, a different kind of process
and a different (kind of) effect than there would have been had the component
activities been the explanans and the causal contributors.
The problems this limitation poses for activities I take to be the following: the
first kind of case is undoubtedly causal and can be given an ontic explanation, but
there is no causal production or componential constitution of the kind implied by the
activity-based account. The right kind of explanandum is lacking. So the activity-
based view has limitations as a causal and an ontically explanatory account. For
those who are only interested in deploying mechanisms to describe or explain
typical cases this might be of little consequence. However, for those who are
looking for something more it might be reason to rethink the causal and ontically
explanatory role attributed to activities. The second kind of case is not incompatible
with the activity-based account as such, as far as causality goes, but that account has
difficulty adequately accounting for it as a case of polygeny. The activity-based
account seems to give at best a restricted, or partial, picture of the causal and
explanatory complexity at issue. The right kinds of explanans are not available. On
the plausible assumption that the second kind of case is frequent, this is, I think, at
least as serious a problem as the first—although I would agree that the case I am
presenting here is more tentative, partly because the activity-based account is
currently difficult to interpret in some of its ontologically crucial aspects.
7 The Explanandum-Problem and the Argument From Perfectly Balancing
Causal Contributors
Let us start with the first problem and have a look at our motorboat again. The wind,
we can imagine, has now turned and comes directly from the east. Moreover, it
perfectly balances the causal contribution made by the engine. The boat no longer
has any speed or movement. Neither the boat nor the engine takes part in the
forward-moving activity at all. At the relevant level of mechanism nothing happens.
There is no relevant activity or regular change at the explanandum level (Fig. 2).
What we have here is an extreme form of polygeny—that is, one without activity
at the level of mechanism in which we are interested. If change is a condition of
effect here, this is a case of polygeny without effect. It can also be described in
terms of the complete masking of the two capacities involved, or in terms of the
perfect balancing of the two forces or causal contributors. Nevertheless, this
situation is clearly causal. I have borrowed the first boat example from Wolff
(2007); and in his terms, for instance, we still have a patient (the boat), which the
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affector (the wind) acts on, where the tendency of the patient (B) is different from
both the affector (the wind) and the actual end-state (status quo). The masking or
balancing, like the outcome in typical cases of causation, is the result of many
contributing forces, only in a slightly (but crucially) different kind of configuration
than that in the first boat example.
Unlike many other polygenic effects, however, this extreme form of polygeny
can occur only where two causal contributors act on the same property of the
affected object. It is because the wind and the engine both contribute also to the
same properties—the direction and speed of the boat—that the one capacity masks
the other and the one force, or causal contributor, balances the other. Now, for the
sake of this first argument it is enough to focus on the fact that this balancing has the
result that nothing happens at the explanandum level of mechanism.
In order to claim this much one does not have to deny that there are activities in
this situation on another level of the mechanism. This denial is superfluous even on
the level where we identify the explanans in the first boat example (provided that
explanans and explanandum belong to different levels of mechanism).15 There are
activities inside the engine, and as a result its propeller takes part in one. But, as we
should immediately concede, this is not something located at the explanandum
level.
To recap: the main problem in this first counter-example is that no activity or
regular change (at the explanandum level) is produced (or constituted) by what
happens at the same or lower levels. For instance, even if the explanandum
phenomenon can be characterized as maintaining constancy,16 this is something
very different from the ‘‘regular changes’’ that should be ‘‘produced’’ on the
activity-based account set out in Machamer et al. (2000). For the sake of the
argument in this section I think we can happily accept that at a lower level the
propeller is performing the same activity in both of our boat examples. The crucial
difference is that it produces (aetiological version) or constitutes (constitutive
version) an activity or regular change (at the relevant explanandum level) in the
former example only. It is true that we might reinterpret the second static case as
one in which the activities of the parts may be said to be non-productive17 of
Bwind
Fig. 2 Polygenic causation ? no explanandum activity
15 However, if we have this problem on any given explanandum level it is likely to obtain on an
explanans level as well (see discussion in next section). This observation strengthens the counter example
but it is not required for the argument as such. That one of the alleged relata of the ontic explanation is
lacking prevents the ontic relation from obtaining.
16 I am grateful to an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
17 As suggested by another anonymous reviewer.
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activities at the higher level; but on the assumptions that causation is always
performed by activities and that ontic explanations always relate activities, this is
not a viable response for the advocate of an ontically serious activity-based account
of mechanisms. Causation and explananda suitable for mechanistic explanation are
available in this case; the problem is that these are not of the right ontological kind
for the activity-based account to handle.
We have identified at least one kind of situation where the activity-based account
breaks down despite the fact that this situation is clearly causal and ontically
explainable. It should now be easy to mimic this kind of extreme situation in
connection with any other activities that lie at the heart of mechanistic interest:
pushing/pulling, opening/closing, heating/cooling, attracting/repelling and binding/
releasing.
8 The Explanans-Problem and the Argument From Different Effects
and Processes
The explanandum-problem of the previous section typically extends to an
explanans-problem as well. This is for two reasons. The first reason is that ontic
explanations of productive continuity are supposed to build chains—see, for
instance the earlier quote from Machamer et al. (2000, p. 3): ‘‘A missing arrow,
namely, the inability to specify an activity, leaves an explanatory gap in the
productive continuity of the mechanism.’’18 Unless the local explanandum of
interest coincides with the global explanandum of interest, what is explanandum in
the local case is supposed to be (intermediary) explanans for some other
phenomenon of interest. The second reason is simply that if there is no activity
on the explanandum level this is often because the activities at the explanans level
are counteracted. There is no activity at the explanandum level because there is no
activity at the explanans level.
It is time to turn to the other, possibly much more widespread, kind of situation
where advocates of activities might be threatened by polygeny. The assessment I
offer in this section is both more general and more tentative than the one I provided
in connection with the case discussed in the previous section. To be perfectly
honest, I am not convinced that it presents a valid objection. I doubt whether at this
point the activity-based approach has sufficient conceptual clarity to settle the
issue.19
In the cases to be considered here, the explanandum, U-ing, that actually occurs
is substantially different from the W-ing that would have occurred if the entity had
18 See, also, the views on ‘‘bottoming out’’ in Machamer et al. (2000) and other writings.
19 On the other hand, this article is not the first to point to the kind of worry I raise in this section.
Woodward (2002, pp. 372–373) expresses a related concern about how component activities are supposed
to link with ‘‘overall productive relationships’’ on Machamer’s view. Woodward’s question is: if the
overall (or higher-level) activity and the alleged component activity differ in kind, then how can the
component activity be productive of the effects of the higher level activity? He thinks this question is
problematic because we cannot assume that productivity is a transitive relation. As will be seen below,
my problem is similar, but my reasoning is different.
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engaged in a certain explanans activity W. In order to strengthen the argument for
this I will offer two versions of it: one where the actualizations of the activities, i.e.,
the U-ing and the W-ing, are conceptualized strictly in terms of what they produce
(i.e., as effects of the activity), and one where they are characterized by their
intrinsic qualities (i.e., as kinds of process, broadly speaking). Since an element of
both is arguably present in our preferred understanding of actualization—as was
claimed in the earlier discussion on productive continuity—it is of value to learn
that both accounts face similar problems.
Let us start with different actualizations understood in terms of their effects.
Surprisingly, even our first motorboat example, in all its simplicity, might be a
perfect example of how a polygenic explanandum effect cannot be accounted for in
terms of more than one explanans activity. What is the alternative to understanding
what actually goes on there as one activity? On the present understanding of
actualizations, the only alternative is that the end-effect is a combination of two
activities both of which occur. The situation reminds us of Nancy Cartwright’s
position on vector-addition of forces:
We add forces (or the numbers that represent forces) when we do calculations.
Nature does not ‘add’ forces. For the ‘component’ forces are not there, in any
but a metaphorical sense, to be added; and the laws that say they are must also
be given a metaphorical reading. (Cartwright 1983, p. 59)
The plausibility of Cartwright’s view depends on the way we conceive forces. If
we understand them as activities defined in terms of the effects they produce,
Cartwright’s position seems exactly right. It is simply not the case that an activity,
W1, productive of the motorboat ending up in A and another activity, W2,
productive of it ending up in B occur. There is but one causal track describing how
the boat moves from its starting-point to position C, and it does not pass through A
or B. There is no real sense in which the effect, U-ing, is the combination of the
effects of W1-ing and W2-ing. Activities cannot account for this polygeny of effect
if they are cast in terms of what they produce. (Moreover, in many cases the
allegedly polygenic effect differs more dramatically from the aggregate effect of
W1-ing and W2-ing. The effects of combined medication are a well-known case in
point.)
Let us continue with the parallel problem that emerges from a characterization of
the actualization of activities in terms of the intrinsic qualities of the processes of
actualization. Suppose there is an intrinsic difference between being guided by the
wind (W1-ing) and being guided by the engine (W2-ing). Then the actual process,
U-ing, resulting in the track from starting point to C will be neither of these kinds of
process. If for no other reason than that the actual process inherits elements from
both W1-ing and W2-ing, U-ing will be intrinsically different from both W1-ing and
W2-ing. This may even be necessary if constitutive approaches are to come out ontic
at all. In fact it is arguable that unless the explananda differ from the alleged
explanans, there can be no ontic relation between them. However, this leaves us
with the possibility that, in some cases, the W1-ing and W2-ing do not exist, or have
no explanatory role to play. Only the activity at the explanandum level is actualized.
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There is merely a U-ing. It is these possibilities that the argument in this section
trades on.
Compare two, more dramatically different, activities for a more radical
transformation: we cannot subtract very many of the intrinsic qualities of a closing
process without changing the relevant U-ing, and therefore the relevant activity, into
something else. For instance, some combinations of simultaneous attempts to
increase the amount of water flowing through a pipe (upstream) with closing-
attempts (downstream) cannot be represented in terms of their characteristic
activities, since they counteract one another and result in other kinds of activity. On
an even more mundane level, trying to think and listen at the same time often has
the result, at least for me, that there is neither an activity of thinking nor an activity
of listening, since another process takes place. This becomes even clearer in cases of
the type deployed in the previous section, i.e., in cases where there is no
explanandum activity at all. In some of those cases, the result will be that there can
be no explanans activity either. I can certainly try to push when someone else is
pulling, but the pushing and its effect have to occur to be a U-ing, i.e., if the entity is
to engage in the activity. Similarly with the extreme polygenic effects that can result
from trying to open and close at the same time—to simultaneously heat and cool,
attract and repel, bind and release, and so on. It would be fanciful to claim that both
activities nevertheless occur. This cannot be because the corresponding actualiza-
tions, W1-ing and W2-ing, are absent. But then, if they do not occur, then, of course,
the activities cannot be the two interacting causal contributors to the polygenic
effect under investigation. Sometimes, at least, activities and polygeny do not
match.
In truth it does not matter whether we focus on effects or intrinsic qualities when
we characterize the U-ing in the conditional ‘if entity E engages in activity U, then
E is U-ing’. For, potentially, there are plenty of polygenic cases where only one U-
ing occurs—a U-ing, moreover, that does not correspond to any of the causal
contributors involved. Accordingly, efforts to highlight effects or intrinsic qualities
cannot prevent some of the explanatory power of the activity-based account of
mechanisms from being lost. Full explanatory power is limited to environments
where the mechanism is set up in the right way, i.e., so as to be free of the threat of
damaging kinds of polygeny.
9 Why Bother?
Why should mechanistic philosophers care about polygeny? It might be complained
that there is no compelling reason for a mechanistic theory to accommodate
polygenic causation. However, that would be an unfortunate complaint for at least
two reasons. First, theories that do not recognize polygeny cannot account for some
important cases of causation. This is a high price to pay, since it seriously
diminishes their value as theories of causation and ontic explanation. Secondly, and
what is even more alarming, failure to recognize polygeny will limit a theory’s
usefulness qua theory of mechanism as well. This is because many important
mechanisms are thought to be decomposable into intricate patterns of parts which
Activity-Based Accounts of Mechanism 147
123
are themselves mechanisms, and to be embedded in larger mechanisms. For
instance, the mechanism of which the motorboat is a part might be decomposed into
the finer mechanisms of the engine, propeller, and construction of the body, and
embedded in a larger mechanism including the wind. If these are going to do
anything other than act on separate aspects of effects—as in the first kind of
polygeny we discussed—or serially—one after another—genuine polygeny of the
second kind is required. Thus, the inability to accommodate polygeny is a serious
shortcoming in a theory of mechanisms.
Just how serious is the threat to activity-based accounts of mechanisms posed by
polygeny? That will depend and may vary, of course, on the specific ontologies of
activity-based mechanisms. To answer such questions robustly one needs to engage
more fully with the metaphysics of activities. Currently, these issues are not worked
out in sufficient detail to give us anything like a final verdict. Even so, I would
claim, problems of the first kind discussed in this article, i.e., those apparent
in situations where no activity occurs on the relevant mechanistic level, show that
the activity-based account of mechanisms proposed in Machamer et al. (2000) is not
the one true account of mechanisms, causation, and ontic explanation.
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